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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been shown to be prone to adversarial attacks. With a growing need to enable
intelligence in embedded devices in this Internet of Things (IoT) era, secure hardware implementation of DNNs has become
imperative. Memristive crossbars, being able to perform Matrix-Vector-Multiplications (MVMs) efficiently, are used to realize DNNs on
hardware. However, crossbar non-idealities have always been devalued since they cause errors in performing MVMs, leading to
degradation in the accuracy of the DNNs. Several software-based adversarial defenses have been proposed in the past to make DNNs
adversarially robust. However, no previous work has demonstrated the advantage conferred by the non-idealities present in analog
crossbars in terms of adversarial robustness. In this work, we show that the intrinsic hardware variations manifested through crossbar
non-idealities yield adversarial robustness to the mapped DNNs without any additional optimization. We evaluate resilience of
state-of-the-art DNNs (VGG8 & VGG16 networks) using benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100) across various crossbar sizes
towards both hardware and software adversarial attacks. We find that crossbar non-idealities unleash greater adversarial robustness
(> 10− 20%) in DNNs than baseline software DNNs. We further assess the performance of our approach with other state-of-the-art
efficiency-driven adversarial defenses and find that our approach performs significantly well in terms of reducing adversarial losses.
Index Terms—Deep Neural Networks, Memristive crossbars, Non-idealities, Adversarial robustness
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, resistive crossbar systems have re-
ceived significant focus for their ability to realize Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) by effciently computing analog dot-
products [1], [2], [3]. These systems have been realized using
a wide range of emerging technologies such as, Resistive
RAM (ReRAM), Phase Change Memory (PCM) and Spintronic
devices [4], [5], [6]. These devices exhibit high on-chip
storage density, non-volatility, low leakage and low-voltage
operation and thus, enable compact and energy-efficient
implementation of DNNs [7], [8].
Despite so many advantages, the analog nature of com-
putation of dot-products in crossbars poses certain chal-
lenges owing to device-level and circuit-level non-idealities
such as, interconnect parasitics, process variations in the
synaptic devices, driver and sensing resistances, etc. [8],
[9]. Such non-idealities lead to errors in the analog dot-
product computations in the crossbars, thereby adversely
affecting DNN implementation in the form of accuracy
degradation [10]. Numerous frameworks have been de-
veloped in the past to model the impact of non-idealities
present in crossbar systems and accordingly, retraining the
weights (stored in synaptic devices) of the DNNs to mitigate
accuracy degradation [9], [10], [11], [12].
Crossbar-based non-idealities, thus, have so far been de-
valued because they lead to accuracy degradation in DNNs.
However, an interesting aspect of these non-idealities in
providing resilience to DNNs against adversarial attacks
has been unexplored. DNNs have been shown to be ad-
versarially vulnerable [13]. A DNN can easily be fooled by
applying structured, yet, small perturbations on the input,
leading to high confidence misclassification of the input.
This vulnerability severely limits the deployment and po-
tential safe-use of DNNs for real world applications such as
self-driving cars, malware detection, healthcare monitoring
systems etc. [14], [15]. Thus, it is imperative to ensure that
the DNN models used for such applications are robust
against adversarial attacks. Recent works such as [16], [17]
show quantization methods, that primarily reduce compute
resource requirements of DNNs, act as a straightforward
way of improving the robustness of DNNs against adver-
sarial attacks. A recent work has led to the development
of a framework called QUANOS that provides a structured
method for hybrid quantization of different layers of a
DNN to produce energy-efficient, accurate and adversari-
ally robust models [15]. In [15], [16], the authors show that
efficiency-driven hardware optimization techniques can be
leveraged to improve software vulnerability, such as, adver-
sarial attacks, while yielding energy-efficiency. In this work,
we present a comprehensive analysis on how device-level
and circuit-level non-idealities intrinsic to analog crossbars
can be leveraged for adversarial robustness in neural net-
works. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show
that the intrinsic hardware variations manifested through
non-idealities in crossbars intrinsically improve adversarial
security without any additional optimization. Our main
finding is that- A DNN model mapped on hardware, while
suffering accuracy degradation, is also more adversarially resilient
than the baseline software DNN.
Contributions: In summary, the key contributions of this
work are as follows:
• We employ a systematic framework in PyTorch [18]
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
11
29
8v
1 
 [c
s.E
T]
  2
5 A
ug
 20
20
2to map DNNs onto resistive crossbar arrays and
investigate the cumulative impact of various circuit
and device-level non-idealities to confer adversarial
robustness.
• We analyse the robustness of state-of-the-art DNNs,
viz. VGG8 and VGG16 [19] using benchmark
datasets- CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [20], respectively,
across various crossbar dimensions.
• We show that crossbar-based non-idealities impart
robustness in neural networks against both hardware
and software-based adversarial attacks.
• We find that non-idealities lead to higher adversarial
robustness (> 10 − 20% for both FGSM and PGD-
based adversarial attacks on hardware) in DNNs
mapped onto resistive crossbars than DNNs evalu-
ated on software.
• We investigate the role of various crossbar param-
eters (such as RMIN ) in unleashing adversarial ro-
bustness to DNNs mapped onto crossbars. We also
study the impact of input Pixel Discretization pro-
posed in [16] together with crossbar non-idealities
on adversarial robustness.
• A comparison of our proposed method with other
state-of-the-art quantization techniques is also pre-
sented to emphasise the importance of hardware
non-idealities in imparting resilience to DNNs
against adversarial inputs.
2 RELATED WORKS
2.1 Strategies to map DNNs onto crossbars with non-
idealities for inference
Prior research works have focused on modeling crossbar
non-idealities to mitigate the problem of accuracy degrada-
tion incurred when DNNs are mapped onto them. Several
frameworks have been proposed such as, CxDNN [10],
that employs matrix-inversion techniques combined with
Kirchoff’s circuit laws to model the effect of interconnect par-
asitics and peripheral non-idealities in the resistive crossbar
arrays. The authors in [21] have presented an approximation
technique based on sample input/output behavior. How-
ever, these analytical models take into account only linear
data-dependent non-idealities while modeling the crossbar
instances. Recent frameworks such as GenieX [9] use a
neural network-based approach to accurately encapsulate
the effects of both data dependent and non-data depen-
dent non-idealities and assess their impact on accuracy
degradation. PUMA is the first Instruction Set Architecture
(ISA)-programmable inference accelerator based on hybrid
CMOS-memristor crossbar technology, which is designed
to maintain crossbar area and energy efficiency as well
as storage density. PUMA has been shown to outperform
other state-of-the-art CPUs, GPUs, and ASICs for ML ac-
celeration [7], [22], [23], [24]. Nevertheless, none of the
aforementioned techniques or architectures have helped
understand the advantages that the intrinsic non-idealities
of the crossbar structures may confer in terms of adversarial
robustness to DNNs.
2.2 Adversarial Defenses
In the recent years, several heuristic adversarial defense
strategies have been developed, including adversarial train-
ing [13], [25], [26], [27], [28], randomization-based tech-
niques [29], [30], [31] and denoising methods [32], [33],
[34], [35]. However, these defenses might be broken by a
new attack in the future since they lack a theoretical error-
rate guarantee [36]. Hence, researchers have strived to de-
velop certified defensive methods [37], [38], [39], [40], which
always maintain a certain accuracy under a well-defined
class of attacks [36]. Even though the certified defense
methods indicate a way to reach theoretically guaranteed
security, their accuracy and efficiency are far from meeting
the practical requirements [36]. Apart from these, several
quantization-based methods on software have been pro-
posed of late, including works like [15], [16], [17] to improve
resilience of neural networks against adversarial perturba-
tions. The work in [16] deals with discretization of the input
space (or allowed pixel levels from 256 values or 8-bit to
4-bit, 2-bit). It shows that input discretization improves the
adversarial robustness of DNNs for a substantial range of
perturbations, besides improvement in its computational
efficiency with minimal loss in test accuracy. Likewise,
QUANOS [15] is a framework that performs layer-specific
hybrid quantization of DNNs based on a metric termed as
Adversarial Noise Sensitivity (ANS) to make DNNs robust
against adversarial perturbations. In contrast to prior works,
we present a first of its kind work that comprehensively
studies the inherent advantage of hardware non-idealities
towards imparting adversarial robustness to DNNs without
relying upon other software-based optimization methodolo-
gies. Note, we also show that combining previously pro-
posed optimization strategies, such as pixel discretization,
with analog crossbars further improves robustness.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Adversarial Attacks
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks in which the
model gets fooled by applying precisely calculated small
perturbations on the input, leading to high confidence
misclassification [15]. The authors in [25] have proposed a
method called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate
the adversarial input by linearization of the loss function
(L) of the trained models with respect to the input (X) as
shown in equation (1).
Xadv = X +  × sign(∇xL(θ,X, ytrue)) (1)
Here, ytrue is the true class label for the input X; θ denotes
the model parameters (weights, biases etc.) and  quantifies
the degree of distortion.
The quantity ∆ =  × sign(∇xL(θ,X, ytrue)) is the net
perturbation added to the input (X), which is controlled by
. It is noteworthy that gradient propagation is, thus, a cru-
cial step in unleashing an adversarial attack. Furthermore,
the contribution of gradient to ∆ would vary for different
layers of the network depending upon the activations [15].
In addition to FGSM-based attacks, multi-step variants of
FGSM, such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13] have
also been proposed that cast stronger attacks.
3To build resilience against against small adversarial per-
turbations, defense mechanisms such as gradient masking
or obfuscation [41] have been proposed. Such methods con-
struct a model devoid of useful gradients, thereby making
it difficult to create an adversarial attack.
Types of Attacks: Broadly, attacks to evaluate adversar-
ial robustness are classified as: Black-Box (BB) and White-
Box (WB). WB attacks are launched when the attacker has
complete knowledge of the target model parameters and
training information. BB attacks, on the other hand, are
launched when the attacker has no knowledge about the
target model parameters. Resilience against WB adversaries
also guarantees resilience against the BB ones for similar
perturbation () range [15]. Thus, all our subsequent exper-
iments are based on WB adversaries for the assessment of
adversarial robustness.
In this work, Clean Accuracy (CA) refers to the accuracy
of a DNN when presented with the test dataset in absence
of an adversarial attack. We define Adversarial Accuracy
(AA) as the accuracy of a DNN on the adversarial dataset
created using the test data for a given task. Adversarial Loss
(AL) is defined as the difference between CA and AA, i.e.,
AL = CA − AA. Higher the value of AA, smaller will be
the value of AL, which implies increased robustness against
adversarial attacks.
3.2 Resistive crossbar arrays and their non-idealities
Resistive crossbar arrays can be harnessed to implement
Matrix-Vector-Multiplications (MVMs) in an analog man-
ner. Crossbars (Fig. 1(a)) consist of 2D arrays of synaptic
devices (programmable resistors realized using emerging
nanotechnologies), Digital-to-Analog (DAC), and Analog-to-
Digital (DAC) converters and a write circuit. The synaptic
devices at the intersection of each row and column are
configured to a particular value of conductance (that ranges
fromGMIN toGMAX ), by enabling the corresponding write
circuits along the Write Wordline (WWL) and the Bitline
(BL). Thereafter, the MVMs are performed by converting
the digital inputs to analog voltages on the Read Wordlines
(RWLs) using DACs, and sensing the output current flowing
through the bitlines (BLs) using the ADCs [8].
Equation (2) shows the ideal MVM operation for an
MxN crossbar, for which Vin is a 1xM vector comprising
the input analog voltages, Gideal is the MxN conductance
matrix (formed by mapping the weights of a DNN onto the
crossbar instances), and Ioutideal is a 1xN vector comprising
output currents.
Ioutideal = Vin ∗Gideal (2)
Non-idealities: The analog nature of the computation
leads to various non-idealities resulting in errors in the
MVMs. These include device-level and circuit-level non-
idealities in the resistive crossbars. Fig. 1(b) shows the
equivalent circuit for the crossbar array and its peripherals
accounting for the non-idealities listed in TABLE 1. The
circuit-level non-idealities have been modelled as parasitic
resistances. The cumulative effect of all the non-idealities
results in the deviation of the output current from its ideal
value, resulting in an Ioutnon−ideal vector. The relative
TABLE 1
Various circuit-level and device-level non-idealities in a resistive
crossbar array
Type of non-idealities Parameters
Circuit non-idealities Rdriver, Rwire row, Rwire col, Rsense
Device non-idealities Gaussian variation profile
deviation of Ioutnon−ideal from its ideal value is denoted
by non-ideality factor (NF) [9] such that:
NF = (Ioutideal − Ioutnon−ideal)/Ioutideal (3)
Thus, increased non-idealities in crossbars can induce a
greater value of NF. This can lead to a significant impact
on the computational accuracy of crossbars and therefore,
degradation in the accuracy of the DNNs implemented on
hardware [8], [9], [10].
Crossbar Mapping: In this work, we use a similar
procedure as that of [8], [10] for mapping DNNs onto
crossbars of various dimensions as shown in Fig. 3(b) .
First, the weights of each layer of the DNN are partitioned
based on the size of the crossbar array used and mapped
onto the crossbar instances. Thereafter, the corresponding
conductance for each value of DNN weight in a crossbar
instance is computed by taking into account the synaptic
device parameters, viz. GMIN , GMAX and bit-precision.
This gives us the ideal conductance matrix (Gideal). Finally,
we consider the circuit-level and device-level non-idealities
present in a crossbar instance specified in TABLE 1, and
convert Gideal into Gnon−ideal using circuit laws (Kirchoff’s
laws and Ohm’s law) and linear algebraic operations [8]. This
completes the mapping of the weights of the DNN onto the
crossbar instances.
3.3 Can non-idealities be leveraged for adversarial ro-
bustness?
Non-idealities inherent in crossbars have so far been pro-
jected in a negative light since, they lead to degradation
in clean accuracy when DNNs are mapped onto them.
However, in this work, we show how the non-idealities (or
an increased value of NF for a crossbar) lead to robustness of
DNNs against adversarial attacks. Thus, we observe lower
adversarial loss (AL) with respect to the corresponding
software implementation of the DNNs. We argue that non-
idealities intrinsically lead to defense via gradient obfuscation
against adversarial perturbations since gradient propagation, as
discussed in Section 3.1, is crucial to initiate an adversarial attack.
Fig. 2 pictorially demonstrates the intuition behind cre-
ation of an adversary in DNNs and how hardware non-
idealities can cause gradient obfuscation. DNNs, being dis-
criminative models, partition a very high-dimensional input
space into different classes by learning appropriate decision
boundaries. The class-specific decision boundaries simply
divide the space into hyper-volumes. These hypervolumes
consist of the training data examples as well as large areas
of unpopulated space that is arbitrary and untrained. The
decision boundary during model training extrapolates to
vast regions of unpopulated high-dimensional subspace
because of linearity/generalization in the model behavior.
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Fig. 1. (a) An ideal crossbar array; (b) A typical non-ideal crossbar array structure with resistive circuit-level non-idealities
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Fig. 2. Pictorial depiction of creation of adversaries for software and
hardware-based DNNs - (a) The data points (shown as ‘dots) encom-
pass the data manifold in the high-dimensional subspace. The classifier
is trained to separate the data into different classes or hypervolumes
based on which the decision boundary is formed. Adversaries are cre-
ated by perturbing the data points into these empty regions or hypervol-
umes and are thus misclassified; (b) The decision boundaries get shifted
owing to the crossbar-based non-idealities in hardware, resulting in the
placement of certain data points into a different hypervolume leading
to accuracy degradation. However, due to gradient obfuscation owing
to crossbar non-idealities, many data points remain restricted in their
original hypervolumes on perturbations. This results in better adversarial
robustness in hardware-based DNNs.
But this exposes the model to adversarial attacks [16]. Ad-
versarial perturbations, essentially, can shift a data point
from its typical hypervolume region to another, leading
to high-confidence missclassification. This has been shown
in Fig. 2(a) with black arrows for a DNN evaluated on
software.
However, when a DNN is mapped onto crossbar arrays,
the decision boundaries are shifted owing to the crossbar-
based non-idealities, resulting in the placement of certain
data points into a different hypervolume (Fig. 2(b)). This
leads to missclassifications and hence, degradation in the
clean accuracy of the DNN. Also, on unleashing adversarial
attacks on a DNN mapped on crossbars, the displacement of
a data point in the high-dimensional subspace gets altered
in a different direction. This has been marked in Fig. 2(b)
using violet arrows which demarcate another direction w.r.t.
the one demarcated using black arrows (for DNNs evalu-
ated on software). Thus, instead of moving into a differ-
ent hypervolume, the many perturbed data points remain
restricted in their original hypervolumes, thereby resulting
in lower adversarial losses (ALs) for the DNN and greater
adversarial robustness.
Quantifying the intuition in Fig. 2: To support our
gradient obfuscation argument, let us consider a DNN
mapped onto crossbars as f . The net perturbation added
to the input (X) in case of an adversarial attack is given
by ∆ =  × sign(∇xL(θ,X, ytrue)) (refer to Section 3.1).
Without loss of generality, we assume the loss function (L)
from the hardware mapped DNN to be a function of the
output current emerging out of a crossbar array (Iout), i.e.:
L = f(Iout)
Since DNNs are sufficiently linear owing to the ReLU acti-
vation functions being used, we can assume that:
L ≈ Iout
In the ideal scenario of crossbars with no non-idealities,
L ≈ Ioutideal
which implies,
∆ideal =  × sign(∇x(Ioutideal)) (4)
However, in the case of non-idealities being present in
crossbar structures,
Ioutnon−ideal = Ioutideal − γ
where, γ denotes the deviation of the output current of
the crossbar from its ideal value due to the inherent non-
idealities. Hence, in the non-ideal scenario, we have:
∆non−ideal =  × sign(∇x(Ioutideal − γ)) (5)
5From equation (5), we find that there is a deviation
in the adversarial perturbation from its ideal value owing
to crossbar non-idealities. Hence, this explains the reason
behind an altered displacement of data points in the high-
dimensional subspace w.r.t. the direction of displacement in
case of a DNN evaluated on software (Fig. 2(b)).
In this work, we employ a framework in PyTorch similar
to RxNN [8], to map DNNs onto a resistive crossbar array
and investigate the cumulative impact of the circuit and
device-level non-idealities (mentioned in TABLE 1) on the
robustness of neural networks against adversarial inputs.
4 METHODOLOGY
The methodology described in Fig. 3(a) is adopted to assess
the robustness of DNNs against adversarial inputs when
implemented on hardware. The entire process is divided
into two parts:
4.1 Part-1 for Software DNN:
We employ benchmark datasets- CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
to evaluate VGG8 and VGG16 networks, respectively. These
networks are first trained on PyTorch with the appropriate
training datasets. Subsequently, we obtain two kinds of
trained models as follows:
1) Model-1: A standard model trained without adding
any random noise to its activations.
2) Model-2: A model trained with random noise
added to all neuronal activation values. Such noise
enabled training has been used in past works [42]
to mitigate the accuracy degradation observed from
mapping DNNs onto crossbars. Essentially, adding
random noise to the neuronal activations is a crude
and approximate way of modeling non-idealities
during the training process.
Attack-SW: We launch FGSM and PGD attacks on the
software models by adding adversarial perturbations to the
clean test inputs. We record the adversarial accuracies (AAs)
and adversarial losses (ALs) in case of each attack.
4.2 Part-2 for Crossbar mapped DNN:
Using a PyTorch-based framework, we layer-wise map the
software DNN weights separately for both Model-1 and
Model-2 onto resistive crossbar instances of sizes- 16x16,
32x32 and 64x64 respectively. We follow the procedure of
mapping the weights of the DNN onto crossbars as de-
scribed in Section 3.2.
We calculate the CAs for both Model-1 and Model-2 for
the crossbar mapped DNN, which are expected to be lesser
than the values obtained for software DNN. Thereafter, we
launch FGSM and PGD attacks on the mapped crossbar-
based models in two modes termed as:
1) Attack-1: The adversarial perturbations for each at-
tack, FGSM & PGD, are created using the software-
based DNN model’s loss function and then added to
the clean input that yields the adverdarial input. The
generated adversaries are then fed to the crossbar
mapped DNN to monitor AL.
TABLE 2
Parameters and their values associated with a resistive crossbar array
Parameter Value
Rdriver 1 kΩ
Rwire row 5 Ω
Rwire col 10 Ω
Rsense 1 kΩ
RMIN 20 kΩ
RMAX 200 kΩ
2) Attack-2: The adversarial inputs are generated for
each attack, FGSM & PGD, using the loss from
the crossbar-based hardware models. As a result,
we can expect the adversaries in this case will not
be as strong as Attack-1 adversaries owing to the
presence of non-idealities that can interfere in the
attack generation process.
We finally record the adversarial accuracies (AAs) and
adversarial losses (ALs) for all modes: Attack-SW, Attack-1,
Attack-2.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Comparison with clean accuracies
The parameters pertaining to the non-ideal resistive cross-
bars for mapping the DNNs are listed in TABLE 2 and
employed for all the simulations unless stated otherwise.
Also, device-level process variation shown in experiments
below has been modelled as a Gaussian variation in the
resistances of the synaptic devices with σ/µ = 10%.
Fig. 4 presents a comparison of clean accuracies of the
trained VGG8 and VGG16 networks (note, Model-1 type)
when evaluated on software and after mapping on non-
ideal crossbars of various dimensions (excluding the device-
level variations). It can be observed that the clean accuracies
drop post-mapping on the crossbars which is a direct im-
plication of the inherent non-idealities in a crossbar causing
errors in MVMs as discussed in Section 3.2. We also see
that accuracies drop more for larger sized crossbars. In
the subsequent subsections, we discuss the implications on
adversarial robustness by inducing Attack-1 and Attack-2 on
the crossbar-mapped models.
5.1.1 Results with CIFAR-10 dataset
In Fig. 5, it can be observed that AL in case of an FGSM
attack on the DNNs mapped onto crossbars of various
dimensions (16x16, 32x32, 64x64) are lesser than that of a
DNN evaluated on software. For different attack strengths
quantified by  values, the value of AL in case of Attack-SW
is significantly greater than Attack-1 or Attack-2 (> 10−15%).
In other words, the hardware-based non-idealities that come
into play when DNNs are mapped onto crossbars provide
robustness against adversarial inputs.
PGD attack, being a multi-step variant of FGSM attack,
is much stronger and yields significantly higher adversarial
losses in DNNs than FGSM attacks. Similar to the case of
FGSM attacks, non-idealities in crossbars provide robust-
ness to the mapped DNNs against adversarial inputs as
shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 3. (a) Flow diagram explaining the methodology followed (CIFAR-10 dataset is used with a VGG8 network (highlighted in red) while, CIFAR-100
dataset is used with a VGG16 network (highlighted in blue)); (b) Pictorial depiction of the steps associated with mapping of an 8x8 weight matrix
into crossbar instances of size 3x3
TABLE 3
Table showing AL (%) for different values of  in case of Attack-2 (PGD) on crossbar sizes of 16x16, 32x32 and 64x64 on Model-1 and Model-2 of
VGG8 network with CIFAR-10 dataset
Attack-2 (PGD) on Model-1 Attack-2 (PGD) on Model-2
 2/255 4/255 8/255 16/255 32/255 2/255 4/255 8/255 16/255 32/255
Cross16 71.78 71.89 71.97 72.52 73.92 68.9 69 69.06 69.5 70.46
Cross32 71.13 71.22 71.55 71.97 73.36 68.77 68.79 69.01 69.41 70.3
Cross64 67.92 67.14 67.38 68.73 71.06 68.43 68.56 68.76 69.15 70.07
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Fig. 4. Bar diagram showing CA of a VGG8 and VGG16 networks on
software and crossbars of sizes 16x16, 32x32 and 64x64
For both FGSM and PGD attacks, we find that ALs in
case of Attack-2 are lesser than Attack-1, indicating that the
mapped DNNs are more resilient to adversarial perturba-
tions created using the crossbar-based hardware models
than the software-based perturbations. Interestingly, we also
find that larger crossbar sizes provide greater robustness
against adversarial attacks (characterized by lower values
of AL for the same value of ) than the smaller ones. This
is because larger crossbars involve greater number of par-
asitic components (non-idealities), thereby imparting more
robustness. This has been shown in TABLE 3 where, the
crossbar size of 64x64 provides the best robustness among
the other crossbar sizes.
Fig. 7 shows the variation in the CAs of Model-1 and
Model-2 for both baseline software DNN (VGG8 network)
and when mapped onto crossbars. We find that on training
a DNN with random noise added to its activations (Model-
2), CAs are significantly lower than those for a normal DNN
(Model-1). As already discussed in the case of Model-1, we
observe similar results for both FGSM and PGD attacks
on Model-2 shown in TABLE 4 and TABLE 5, all of which
affirm that hardware-based non-idealities lead to reduc-
tion in adversarial losses and improvement in adversarial
robustness(> 10 − 15%). Furthermore, in case of Model-
2, we also find that larger crossbar sizes provide greater
robustness against adversarial attacks than the smaller ones
as indicated by TABLE 3, where AL for a particular value
of  is the highest in case of a 16x16 crossbar, followed by
a 32x32 crossbar and the least for a 64x64 crossbar. From
the values of AL presented in TABLE 3, the reader might be
misleaded into thinking that Model-2 yields greater adver-
sarial robustness than Model-1 when mapped on crossbars.
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Fig. 5. A plot between AL and  for Attack-SW, Attack-1 and Attack-2 (FGSM) on Model-1 (VGG8 network with CIFAR-10 dataset) for crossbar sizes
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Fig. 6. A plot between AL and  for Attack-SW, Attack-1 and Attack-2 (PGD) on Model-1 (VGG8 network with CIFAR-10 dataset) for crossbar sizes
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TABLE 4
Table showing AL (%) for different values of  in case of Attack-SW, Attack-1 and Attack-2 (FGSM) on Model-2 (VGG8 network with CIFAR-10
dataset) for crossbar sizes of 16x16 and 32x32
16x16 crossbar 32x32 crossbar
 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Attack-SW 0 53.52 62.86 68.5 71.64 74.03 75.37 0 53.52 62.86 68.5 71.64 74.03 75.37
Attack-1 0 39.67 48.32 53.38 56.68 59.08 60.73 0 39.93 48.51 53.27 56.59 58.75 60.29
Attack-2 0 38.08 46.08 50.49 53.45 54.99 56.44 0 38.44 45.6 50.5 53.01 54.75 56.05
However, the fact is that the general trend of finding lower
values of AL for Model-2 with respect to Model-1 for a given
 is because of significantly smaller CAs of Model-2 when
compared with Model-1 (Fig. 7), and not higher values of
AA.
Effect of RMIN on adversarial robustness: The effective
resistance of a crossbar structure is the parallel combination
of resistances along its rows and columns. A smaller value
of RMIN reduces the effective resistance of the crossbar and
increases the value of NF for the crossbar [9]. As we have
already argued that an increased value of NF improves the
adversarial robustness of crossbars, so on decreasing RMIN
to 10 kΩ (maintaining a constant RMAX/RMIN ratio of 10)
we find that ALs (for a PGD attack) in case of smaller RMIN
are lower than the corresponding ALs for a larger RMIN as
shown in Fig. 8.
However, we also observe that in case of smaller RMIN ,
the DNN achieves greater robustness against Attack-1 than
Attack-2, contrary to what has been observed in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6. This is because of larger adversarial perturbations
created on hardware during Attack-2 with lower RMIN .
Lowering RMIN causes larger values of output currents in
the crossbar arrays (due to smaller effective resistance of the
crossbars). To verify this, we employ a metric called Distor-
tion Coefficient (d) that quantifies the degree of distortion of
test images of the dataset over a batch during an adversarial
attack. Mathematically, it is given as:
d =
∑
i
|NC −NA|
N
(6)
8TABLE 5
Table showing AL (%) for different values of  in case of Attack-SW, Attack-1 and Attack-2 (PGD) on Model-2 (VGG8 network with CIFAR-10
dataset) for crossbar sizes of 16x16 and 32x32
16x16 crossbar 32x32 crossbar
 0 2/255 4/255 8/255 16/255 32/255 0 2/255 4/255 8/255 16/255 32/255
Attack-SW 0 81.25 81.33 81.5 82.34 84.16 0 81.25 81.33 81.5 82.34 84.16
Attack-1 0 72.57 72.6 73.11 73.78 75.38 0 72.01 72.26 72.51 73.41 75.08
Attack-2 0 68.9 69 69.06 69.5 70.46 0 68.77 68.79 69.01 69.41 70.3
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(PGD) for a VGG8 network mapped on 32x32 crossbars using CIFAR-
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ratio
where, NC = normalized pixel value of clean image, NA
= normalized pixel value of adversarially perturbed image,
i denotes the indices of a pixel in an image and N = total
number of pixels across an image.
From TABLE 6, we observe that the distortion coefficient
d over a batch of images for Attack-2 is greater than Attack-
1. This verifies that Attack-2 is stronger than Attack-1 and
hence, greater adversarial robustness is observed in case of
Attack-1 w.r.t Attack-2 with lower RMIN .
Effect of RMAX at constant RMIN on adversarial
robustness: Fig. 9 shows results for PGD attack on a VGG8
network mapped onto crossbars with constant RMIN of
TABLE 6
Table showing values of distortion coefficient over a batch (calculated
using equation 6) and AL for PGD attack ( = 8/255) on VGG8 network
mapped onto 32x32 crossbar with CIFAR-10 dataset. The value of
RMIN = 10 kΩ and RMAX/RMIN = 10 for the crossbar
Type of Attack Distortion coefficient (d) AL (%)
Attack-1 0.047288 61.61
Attack-2 0.050654 69.72
20 kΩ and RMAX/RMIN ratio increased by increasing the
value of RMAX . We find that even increasing RMAX by
a factor of 200 results in no added advantage in terms of
adversarial robustness for Attack-1 or Attack-2. Hence, we
find that there is a greater impact of RMIN on adversarial
robustness than RMAX .
Effect of process variation on adversarial robustness:
Fig. 10 shows results for PGD attack on a VGG8 network
mapped onto crossbars by varying the σ/µ ratio, pertaining
to synaptic device variation, from 5 − 15% . Similar to the
case of increasing the value of RMAX , we find no added
advantage in terms of adversarial robustness for Attack-1 or
Attack-2 by increasing the Gaussian variation in the devices
of the crossbars.
Studying the combined effect of input pixel discretiza-
tion and crossbar non-idealities: In [16], the authors show
that input pixel discretization from 256 or 8-bit level to 4-
bit, 2-bit improves adversarial resilience of software DNNs.
Here, we unleash FGSM attack on the VGG8 network
mapped onto 32x32 crossbars with input image pixels of
the CIFAR-10 test dataset discretized to 4-bits (or 16 levels)
and 2-bits (4 levels). The results are shown in Fig. 11.
Interestingly, we find that with pixel discretization, ALs
on crossbar mapped DNN for both Attack-1 and Attack-2
attain a fixed value and do not vary on increasing  from
0.1 to 0.3. This implies that input pixel discretization does
not necessarily help in resiliency when attacking hardware
mapped DNNs. For lower values of , greater adversar-
ial robustness is observed without pixel discretization. At
higher value of  ( = 0.3), the combined effect of 4-bit
pixel discretization and crossbar non-idealities outperforms
the rest in terms of adversarial robustness. Furthermore, 2-
bit pixel discretization not only reduces the clean accuracy
to 72.89% but also imparts marginally lesser adversarial
robustness than 4-bit pixel discretization -< 0.8% for Attack-
1 and < 1.48% for Attack-2.
5.1.2 Results with CIFAR-100 dataset
The results shown in Fig. 12 are similar to those in the
case of the VGG8 network evaluated with CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Crossbar-based non-idealities impart adversarial robustness
to the mapped VGG16 network (> 10 − 20%) against
both FGSM and PGD-based attacks. However, with CIFAR-
100 dataset, we clearly observe that DNN shows greater
adversarial robustness against PGD attack in case of Attack-2
w.r.t Attack-1 than what is observed with CIFAR-10 dataset.
Quantitatively, there is ∼ 7% greater robustness in case of
Attack-2 w.r.t Attack-1 with CIFAR-100 dataset against ∼ 4%
with CIFAR-10 dataset, albeit the drop in clean accuracy for
the DNN mapped onto crossbars is higher in case of CIFAR-
100 dataset (Fig. 4).
Comparison with Related works: We compare the per-
formance of non-ideality-driven adversarial robustness in
crossbars against state-of-the-art software-based adversar-
ial techniques described in [15], [16]. Note, [15], [16] use
efficiency driven transformations (that implicitly translate
to hardware benefits) such as, quantization to improve
resilience. In contrast, our work utilizes explicit hardware
variations to improve robustness. We aim to compare the
robustness obtained from implicit and explicit hardware
techniques. We observe that for single-step FGSM attack on
a VGG16 network mapped on 32x32 crossbars (note, Model-
1 type DNN), adversarial robustness due to crossbar non-
idealities, Attack − 1 results, outperforms all other tech-
niques (Fig. 13(a)). For multi-step PGD attack, Attack − 1
ranks second ((Fig. 13(b)). With respect to 4-bit (4b) pixel
discretization of input data [16], non-idealities in crossbars
impart ∼ 15% greater adversarial robustness in case of
FGSM attack and ∼ 12% greater adversarial robustness in
case of PGD attack. On the other hand, in case of FGSM
attack, crossbar-based non-idealities impart ∼ 4% greater
adversarial robustness than QUANOS [15], while for PGD
attack, QUANOS outperforms by ∼ 18− 22%.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we perform a comprehensive analysis to show
how crossbar-based non-idealities can be harnessed for ad-
versarial robustness. This work brings in a new standpoint
that does not devalue the importance of non-idealities or
parasitics present in crossbar systems. We develop a frame-
work based on PyTorch that maps state-of-the-art DNNs
(VGG8 and VGG16 networks) onto resistive crossbar arrays
and evaluates them with benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100). We show that circuit-level non-idealities
(e.g., interconnect parasitics) and synaptic device-level non-
idealities intrinsically provide robustness to the mapped
DNNs against adversarial attacks, such as FGSM and PGD
attacks. This is reflected by lower accuracy degradations
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during adversarial attacks in case of DNNs mapped on
crossbars than that of software-based DNNs (> 10 − 15%).
We also find that larger crossbar sizes extend greater re-
silience to the DNNs even against stronger PGD attacks.
We investigate the influence of various crossbar param-
eters on the adversarial robustness of the mapped DNNs.
While large values of RMAX do not produce any appre-
ciable effect on adversarial robustness, a smaller value of
RMIN makes the network more adversarially robust. Fur-
thermore, increasing the σ/µ ratio of the synaptic devices
pertaining to process variation does not yield any significant
benefit in terms of adversarial robustness. We further com-
pare the performance of our non-ideality driven approach to
adversarial robustness in a 32x32 crossbar with other state-
of-the-art software-based adversarial defense techniques on
CIFAR-100 dataset. We find that our approach performs
significantly well in terms of reducing adversarial losses
during FGSM or PGD attacks.
In our present work, in order to substantiate our claim,
we have taken into account a crossbar system that does not
include selector devices (such as MOSFETs) being connected
in series with the resistive synaptic devices. In other words,
we have not considered the impact of non-idealities pertain-
ing to 1T-1R crossbar system that are non-linear in nature.
Thus, in our future work we shall extend our analysis
to 1T-1R memresistive crossbar arrays by employing an
architecture similar to GENIE-x [9] that accounts for both
data-dependent and data-independent non-idealities while
modeling the crossbar instances. Finally, our comprehensive
analysis and encouraging results establish the idea of re-
thinking analog crossbar computing for adversarial security
in addition to energy efficiency.
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